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THE FUTURE OF NATO

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THE FUTURE OF NATO

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1990

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room SD-419, Hon. Claiborne Pell (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Pell, Sarbanes, Simon, and Pressler.

The CHARIMAN. The Committee on Foreign Relations will come to order.

The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the consequences for NATO of what is now recognized as the revolution of 1989, which swept from power discredited Communist governments that have ruled Eastern Europe for more than four decades.

As a political organization, as a military coordinating body, NATO has been the foundation of Western unity since 1949, but NATO was formed as a response to the installation of the very Communist governments that have now fallen.

Accordingly, we have been returned by historical developments to a reexamination of first principles and one of our first principles has been the need for a NATO strategy of forward defense and flexible response, to deal with a threat of unified Warsaw Pact invasion.

This strategy has entailed that NATO maintain the option of using nuclear weapons first in the event of a Soviet invasion. To equip ourselves for that option, our country has deployed a vast nuclear arsenal, including thousands of nuclear weapons, in Europe, that have given us, theoretically—and I emphasize theoretically—the capability to implement gradual escalation using limited nuclear options.

With our assessment of the Warsaw Pact threat undergoing a radical revision, this strategy should be reassessed as well, and I would add, speaking personally, I have always questioned these assumptions of first use, or that there can be such a thing as a limited nuclear war.

Another first principle has been the centrality of West German participation in NATO, both politically and militarily; yet, as we contemplate the prospect of German unification, we must respond to the considerable pressures, including proposals from Moscow and German leaders, toward a unified Germany that is militarily neutralized, either partially or entirely.

Some even propose that NATO be dissolved in response to the de facto dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. I must say, here too, I have

said for many years that a united Germany should ideally also be an unarmed Germany, but here I recognize the political impracticality of this path that I have advocated in the past.

We must address ourselves to these fundamental questions with care and deliberation before we find ourselves, as Dean Acheson did in the late 1940's, present at the creation of a new order.

Our witnesses today contribute to that process of deliberation. We welcome them, and I would turn to the ranking minority member. Senator Pressler, if you would care to make a statement?

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am very glad to welcome the witnesses here today, especially a former classmate of mine, I believe, Mr. William Taft, and to say that I look forward to hearing any thoughts here this morning on where we are going in NATO, which I think is a very important subject.

Recently, we have heard that some of our policy planners believe that there is no threat in Europe in terms of the future stationing of troops there. We have some very prosperous countries there, all allies of ours, and my constituents at least question whether we should keep any troops in Europe.

Some years ago, I had an amendment on the Senate floor to reduce the number of our troops in Europe, and it only got 16 votes, although it was picked by "Congressional Quarterly" as one of the key votes in terms of decisions that had to be made by our government for the year.

So, why do we keep troops in Europe at this point?

I believe the Chairman is going to insert into the record, or has inserted an editorial that we should declare victory in Vienna and shake hands with the Soviets and reduce our troop levels, work for a zero troop level, as opposed to the 195,000 troop level.

So we are faced with taxpayers who have wondered why we keep troop levels in Europe at such a high level, why we are continuing to insist on even a 195,000 level. Is there a threat, and if there is not a threat, what is the justification for keeping troops there?

I will listen and learn as much as I can this morning. I thank the witnesses, and I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. Following up his thought, I would ask unanimous consent to have inserted in the record at this point an article in today's "Washington Post" by Charles Krauthammer indicating that perhaps arms control can be an impediment rather than a help toward moving ahead in the world as it is today.

[The information referred to follows:]

DECLARE VICTORY IN VIENNA

(By Charles Krauthammer of the Washington Post)

What on Earth are we doing still at the conventional arms talks in Vienna? Negotiations continue over how many Soviet and American troops may remain in Europe—in his State of the Union address, the president proposed yet another number, 195,000 each—at a time when Europe has made it abundantly clear that it wants a Soviet troop level of zero.

The CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks in Vienna have been superseded by events. When they began there was a Warsaw Part. There were satellite governments in Eastern Europe. It made sense to negotiate a reduction of the Soviet troop advantage down to a level of equality with ours.

But now everything has changed. There is no Warsaw Pact. By summer there may be no East Germany. Next year there may not even a U.S.S.R. The President's new proposal seems to be a response to the revolution of 1989, but because it cannot shake the American obsession with arms control, it is in fact a step backward.

Once again, arms control proves not just irrelevant but counterproductive. Why, after all, are we legitimizing the presence of 195,000 Soviet troops in the "Central Zone" of Eastern Europe? The people of that zone—Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary—are quite clear as to how many Soviet troops they want. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have officially asked the Soviets for a troop level of zero. Lech Walesa just 3 weeks ago demanded the same for Poland. (Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski disagrees, but he is yesterday's man.) And in East Germany, even the Communists have now called for German reunification—and a reunified Germany, whether neutral or NATO, cannot be home to Soviet troops.

Yet here comes the United States saying that it is quite prepared to see 195,000 Soviet troops in countries where they are not wanted.

This legitimation of the Soviet presence undermines the brave East European democrats who demand an immediate Soviet evacuation. They are desperate to get rid of their Soviet occupiers now while the going is good, i.e., while Gorbachev is in control. They fear that if they wait, some calamity might intervene and cost them their historic opportunity for independence.

CFE delays the process. We and the Soviets are now engaged in months of arduous negotiation about verification procedures, counting rules and similar niceties. This week's breakthrough is a Western agreement to accept separate limits for combat planes and "air defense interceptors," a category of plane that until last Monday we said did not exist.

This is all quite surreal. If, as the East Europeans demand and as eventually must happen, the Soviets leave Eastern Europe completely, who needs all these negotiated categories and compromises? Zero is zero. The CFE process is simply prolonging the Soviet stay in Eastern Europe at a time when every other force, natural and political, is demanding their departure.

Bush's 195,000 proposal has a second effect just as pernicious. It perpetuates the CFE symmetry between the level of American and Soviet troops. The symmetry is false morally and mischievous politically. The Soviet troops are occupiers. American troops are there by invitation of freely elected governments.

Politically the symmetry is just as noxious. The Soviet presence in East Europe is headed to zero. Therefore, as long as we keep proposing equal troop levels for the United States and the U.S.S.R., we imply that the Soviet evacuation of Europe should be accompanied by an American evacuation.

This is a bad idea. First, because our allies want an American presence. Some, like the British, are quite fearful that we may indeed be packing our bags. As in Asia, the presence of American troops is almost universally felt by the locals to be not a threat but a kind of insurance against instability.

Second, a mutual Soviet and American evacuation of Europe is not a truly symmetrical act. Russia is a Eurasian land power. Evacuation means pulling back a few hundred miles behind the Polish border. For the Soviets to return to Europe in a crisis means crashing through a few toll booths at the Polish frontier. For the United States to return means crossing the Atlantic, a 3,000-mile wide submarine lair.

It is true that Americans might at some point decide to leave Europe regardless. Fine. By all means, let us have a debate at home and with our allies about the appropriate level, if any, of American troops in a post-Communist Europe. But that level should be determined by Western needs, not by arbitrary numbers chosen to produce CFE symmetry and State of the Union applause.

What to do? Declare that the CFE negotiators in Vienna have succeeded grandly. That we and the Soviets are now agreed in principle to reduce our forces to a ceiling of 195,000 on either side. That we believe further reductions might be in order and should immediately be negotiated bilaterally between the concerned countries.

Such a declaration would allow events to follow nature. The Warsaw Pact countries would then proceed to ask the Soviets to reduce their troops to zero. And we could then conduct a conversation with ourselves and our allies as to how many Americans should remain on the continent.

We don't need a CFE treaty or formal signing ceremony, however useful a photo opportunity it offers a President. We should declare victory at Vienna, shake hands with the Soviets, compliment them on their vision and forthrightness and wish them well in their negotiations with their Warsaw Pact friends. Then we all go to the opera.

Never will an arms control negotiation have ended more successfully.

The CHAIRMAN. I would turn now to Mr. Dobbins, who is the Acting Assistant Secretary for European Affairs.

Senator SIMON. If I could just add a word here, first I want to question Ambassador Taft very thoroughly about what kind of a student Senator Pressler was. [Laughter.]

Second, just a general comment, and we will get to this in the question period. My overall impression is that the defense budget does not recognize anything has happened in the world in the last 6 months, and I think that has to change.

Second, it seems to me the two things that we have to be, as a result of that change, is creative and responsive, and I do not think at this point we are either, but I look forward to hearing from our two witnesses and then having a chance to question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Dobbins?

STATEMENT OF JAMES F. DOBBINS, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think your remarks highlight the timeliness of these hearings. We are indeed in a time of rapid change. In December, Secretary Baker outlined what he conceived of as the major components of the U.S. European relationship in this time of rapid change and in a new era, which we see dawning.

The three components were first of all the NATO relationship, second the relationship between the United States and the European community, and third, American participation in the CSCE—Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Of these three, NATO clearly will remain the preeminent institution for the management of European security and for America's participation in that process. As, and if, the threat to NATO continues to recede, the military component of NATO will remain essential, but the political elements of security will become increasingly important and NATO will continue to increase its role in coordinating the Western approach to security through arms control, through verification, through confidence-building measures, and through other measures designed to reinforce and ensure that the positive changes that have taken place in Europe continue and become irreversible.

The relationship between the United States and the European community will be important not just in an economic sense but also in a political sense, as the community increasingly becomes the core of a truly united Europe, and thus we want to enhance that relationship as well.

Finally, the CSCE forum offers a 35-nation pan European forum in which the United States and Canada are both full participants, in which we can begin to build a yet broader European structure for peace, one which is less dependent over time on military components of security, although in my view those will remain essential insofar as one can see into the future.

Each of these obviously have somewhat overlapping areas of competency, but we do not consider that a source, necessarily, of conflict. As a practical matter the European community, particu-

larly on the political aspects of security, operates as a caucus within NATO, and NATO in turn operates as a caucus within the CSCE structure, and this allows the West to very effectively manage a creative approach to European security.

You have touched on what perhaps is the principal challenge before us in the near to mid term, and that is flanging the process of German unification in a way that enhances security in Europe.

It is our view that a democratic and united Germany will want to, and we should want it to, retain all of its links with the West—with the European community, with all the other institutions for economic and political cooperation, and in particular with the NATO alliance, and thus we see a continuing and full role for Germany in the NATO alliance.

There have been a number of suggestions put forward in recent days by leading German politicians, by the NATO Secretary General, regarding how the territory which is currently the German Democratic Republic—if the people of the German Democratic Republic choose some new relationship with the Federal Republic, and perhaps a relationship which encompasses full unification—how that territory might be treated in terms of European security, and I think these concepts have to be examined carefully and discussed in the coming weeks and months.

I think in the question period we can go more deeply into Senator Pressler's question about, why American troops in Europe? It is our view that there is going to be a continuing necessity for an American troop commitment in Europe, and I would cite just briefly a couple of reasons.

First of all, the very positive changes that are underway in Europe today are anything but irreversible. While we look very favorably on the changes, particularly the changes in the Soviet Union, Soviet policy continues very much to depend on the attitudes and outlooks of a single individual, and thus is dependent in large measure on his success in continuing to promote those policies.

Even, however, in the context of the most hopeful assessments of 5 or 10 years out, of substantial or total Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe, significant reductions in overall force levels, both East and West, I think that every analyst, every planning staff that I have had any contact with, still believes that the Soviet Union will remain the only country in the world capable of destroying the United States and that Europe will remain the area in which some conflict which could grow to that level of conflict is most likely to occur, and therefore a strong American engagement in promoting European security, which we have had over the last 40 years, is going to continue to be a very worthwhile insurance policy.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dobbins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DOBBINS

Europe is undergoing a political, economic and military transformation. While the European community moves toward greater voluntary unity, the East Bloc is breaking up as Eastern European peoples seek fuller expression of their individual and national aspirations. The Warsaw Pact, without foundation in the legitimate political life of the nations of Eastern Europe, is tottering. Whether and how it will survive is an open question.

The rapid pace of change in the East raises questions about the long-term future of Western arrangements for security, political and economnic cooperation. In particular, the continued relevance of NATO in a period when the Warsaw Pact may be in dissolution is no longer self-evident to everyone.

In his State of the Union address the President proposed deep new cuts in the levels of United States and Soviet troops in Europe. The added impetus he has thus given to the GTE negotiations demonstrates that we are serious about drastically reducing the military confrontation in Europe. We must remember, however, that although reductions in conventional forces resulting from a GTE agreement, coupled with greater political independence in Eastern Europe, will lessen the military threat to our NATO allies, that does not imply that all threats have disappeared forever. Indeed, the outlines of the emerging new order are unclear, and uncertainty produces anxiety as well as hope.

Europe and the Future of NATO

Much of the change we are seeing is due to NATO's steadfast defense of Western values and security throughout the most dangerous years of the post War era now coming to an end. In contrast to the East, the challenge we are facing today is a challenge born of success. We must now look for ways to extend that success to all of Europe. NATO's essential mission of preserving the peace and freedom of its members encompasses both the values and the stability needed for this transition period.

NATO's founding principles, as embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, charge it with "strengthening free * * * institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being," including economic collaboration. The example of the Atlantic Alliance clearly has something to offer to the nations of Eastern Europe in search of models to guide their progress.

There is thus absolutely no equivalence between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Throughout its history, the Pact has been a military superstructure imposed by an occupying power on subject peoples. The Atlantic Alliance has always been and will remain a voluntary arrangement for collective security. Its roots go to the wellspring of universal human values. It is responsive to but not predicated upon the present, or any, level of Soviet threat.

NATO should therefore continue, even in an era of radically diminished danger of war, to be the principal instrument by which Western governments manage European and transatlantic security. We and our Allies agree on this point. Moreover, as the military component of our security perhaps loses some urgency, the political component becomes relatively more important and requires just as much coordination.

The transformation of the European security landscape includes dangers, some of which are unforeseeable. Security and stability are required for that transition as the old regimes are swept away in Eastern Europe and new democratic institutions and market economies grow strong enough to take their place. NATO can provide the requisite military and political stability.

If present trends continue, NATO's political contribution to European stability will gradually increase relative to its military contribution. The key word here, however, is "gradually." All of us are understandably eager for a "peace dividend," but we all need to remember that the new Europe "whole and free" we have so long dreamt of is not yet a reality.

More than an insurance policy, NATO should also play an active role in shaping the emerging political and security architectures of Europe, in concert with the EC, CSCE and other institutions.

The administration has expressed strong support for intensified European integration in the political and security as well as economic spheres. Without taking sides in the current European debate over monetary union, we support an intensified process of European integration. This need not and, we are confident, will not preclude a community open to cooperation with both East and West.

The future of U.S. political and economic relations with the EC will be of paramount importance. This is why in his December 12, 1989 speech to the Berlin Press Club Secretary Baker proposed strengthening—perhaps by treaty—the institutional and consultative links between the U.S. and the EC, preferably in parallel with steps to initiate a common internal market in 1992. We would thus hope to highlight the importance we attach to this relationship and consolidate the structure of our consultations with the EC.

The roles and objectives of the EC and NATO are fundamentally complementary. The security provided by NATO has paved the way for the emergence of democratic

institutions and economic integration in the West. This essential relationship will continue irrespective of change in the East.

We will also seek to enhance Europe's role in our transatlantic security partnership. We have been unequivocal in our support of a second pillar to the Alliance, a distinct European voice on security issues. How our European Allies choose to build such a pillar is, of course, for them to decide.

The U.S. will continue to champion the concept of a distinct European dimension to Western security. More equitable burdensharing within the Alliance also makes it necessary to press for a more concrete form for the European pillar. Whatever institutions the Europeans settle on, they must include more effective ways of collaborating with other Allies in the NATO frame-work. We do not insist on any particular formula but will press the Europeans to relate the European voice more effectively to NATO.

NATO's relationship to the CSCE process will also be of capital importance in this decade. The CSCE process is a mechanism for enhancing the full range of East-West relations which includes, along with the United States and Canada, all European states except Albania. Through CSCE the NATO allies have improved economic and political ties to the East, insisted on the observation of human rights, promoted democratic institutions, encouraged the development of East-West trade and investment, and ameliorated security relations through confidence building. All of these roles must continue with even greater intensity.

The CSCE process has played a stimulating role in the changes now underway in the East. CSCE carries with it the potential for expanded European cooperation and institutionalization—electoral standards, emigration rules, juridical codes, disputes settlement, etc.—all of which can create a healthier political and security environment on the continent. We will continue to work within NATO to shape new cooperative approaches to the East through CSCE.

NATO has played a key role in the development of Western arms control policies for over two decades and continues to do so in negotiations such as GEE, CSBM's and Open Skies. Its responsibilities for implementing European arms control agreements, while not supplanting national responsibilities for verification and compliance, will grow. We envision these responsibilities extending to the implementation of the CFE and Open Skies treaties and beyond. To this end, in his Berlin speech Secretary Baker proposed the creation of a NATO arms control verification staff to coordinate and assist in the implementation of arms control agreements.

In today's increasingly interdependent world the Alliance can also serve a useful function in coordinating consideration of global problems. The spread of chemical and biological weapons, as well as nuclear and missile technologies, puts NATO Allies and everyone else at risk. Regional conflicts heighten the danger that such technologies will be used. Problems of the environment also affect the security and well-being of Europe and North America, and have become truly global in scope, requiring more concerted solutions than we have seen heretofore.

NATO Strategy

I want to stress again that the fact of a continuing military role for NATO is not predicated upon the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact or upon any specific level of threat from the East. NATO is a defensive alliance based upon the principle of collective security. Its principal objective is, "to preserve peace in freedom, to prevent war, and to establish a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe."

The Harmel Report enunciated this policy in 1967, and it was reaffirmed in the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament adopted at the May 1989 NATO summit. Accordingly, NATO's arms control policy aims at enhancing "security and stability at the lowest balanced level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements of the strategy of deterrence."

In order to implement its strategy the Alliance settled in 1967 on the doctrine of flexible response, that is, an aggressor will be met with a level of force adequate to repel the attack and restore deterrence. Flexible response and extended deterrence, provided by the U.S. strategic umbrella, form the cornerstone of NATO's defensive posture. The Comprehensive Concept noted that effective deterrence would, "for the foreseeable future * * * require an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces." The particular mix and level of these forces are not fixed by NATO strategy. Indeed, the "practical expression (of the principles underlying the strategy of deterrence) in terms of the size, structure and deployment of forces is bound to change * * * in response to changing international circumstances, technological progress and developments in the scale of the threat—in particular, in the posture and capabilities of the forces of the Warsaw Pact."

Since conventional forces contribute to deterrence through their ability to meet a potential aggressor as far forward as possible, the Alliance will have to think through NATO troop levels and force posture in light of the reductions produced by the CFE negotiations and unilateral Eastern cuts. In making these calculations we will need to keep in mind the possibility that circumstances in the East can change for the worse as well as the better.

Just as no one predicted a year ago the security environment in which we find ourselves today, so no one can foretell with any certainty what the situation will be in 1991 or 1995. Wishful thinking or extrapolating from present trends is not good enough. NATO might at some point need to reconstitute its forces, including U.S. forces, at higher levels. In considering U.S. force levels, we will also have to be mindful of what role we want to play within NATO and Europe even after the Soviet troops have gone home.

All of our Allies want a continued U.S. military presence in Europe at some significant level no matter what the outcome of present and future arms control negotiations. Our Allies see the U.S. presence as an important offset to still sizable Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities in the region; as a credible link to the American strategic nuclear guarantee; and as a stabilizing influence on the continent during a period of great change. This is a view that many in the East increasingly seem to share. Indeed, the history of the Twentieth Century teaches us that a U.S. presence in Europe ensures the peace. There are, in other words, solid political and security reasons for a viable NATO military role under U.S. leadership for the foreseeable future.

NATO and the East

There remains the major question of the Soviet role in a future Europe with a vigorously functioning NATO, an EC achieving greater integration with new political and perhaps security roles, but where the Warsaw Pact has withered away and the two German states have moved to some new, closer relationship. I would argue that whatever happens to the institutions the Soviets imposed on Eastern Europe—CEMA and the Warsaw Pact—the Soviet Union has a stake in the continued vitality of the institutions freely created in the West—the EC and NATO and, bridging East and West, the CSCE process.

This may not be so difficult a case to make as might at first glance appear. The dynamism of the EC is the best hope for promoting economic growth in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The stability of NATO is the best hope for promoting peaceful change and a supportive context for political and economic reform in the East, including in the U.S.S.R. Whatever new arrangements emerge between the two German states can also best be accommodated within, rather than outside, the context of Western cooperation.

CONCLUSION

We are surrounded by proof of our success, but we must not allow ourselves to grow complacent. The historical conflicts and tensions that led to wars in the past still exist.

Our vision for NATO, European integration and the U.S. role in Europe is based on peace, not war; nor is it dependent on analogous Eastern institutions or even on an analogous Soviet role in Eastern Europe. We envision Europe as an undivided continent where the threat of war has been removed; where military forces exist solely to preserve peace and ensure self-defense; where national sovereignty is respected; and where individual rights are recognized and protected. This goal can only be reached in stages. In getting there we will have to remember that Europe is and will remain part of the wider transatlantic community, and that fundamental American interests require that we remain a part of Europe. In this way we can continue our common effort to secure peace and freedom in all of Europe during the next 40 years, and beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. I would now turn to Ambassador Taft, who is our Ambassador to NATO, our permanent representative to NATO.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COUNCIL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Mr. TAFT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, going to the very important question Senator Simon raised, I think it will come as no surprise to him to know that everything I remember about Senator Pressler's performance at law school was absolutely outstanding.

Senator SIMON. You are a diplomat.

Mr. TAFT. I will continue to remember it that way all through the hearing. Secretary Dobbins has referred to Secretary Baker's speech in Berlin in December, and that certain did set out the road map for the alliance and lays out the work that we do in NATO in the coming year.

I should say that that speech was very well received in Europe among the ministers in the NATO communique which was issued by ministers just 2 days after the speech in Brussels.

The fundamental elements of that speech for the NATO component were endorsed and particularly the thrust of it to engage NATO more in the political issues of Europe was welcomed by the ministers.

Clearly, Mr. Chairman, we are now in a moment of entering a new era in world affairs, as the President said in his State of the Union address.

At NATO our European and Canadian allies are approaching the challenges of this new era with a lot of excitement, with a lot of enthusiasm, but also with a degree of uncertainty and caution. They are heartened by the opportunities in Europe to overcome the division of that continent and particularly in Germany the division of that country. This is a goal which has been fundamental to our alliance. But they are also acutely aware of the potential for instability in these developments that are changing very rapidly and at a pace that few people predict more than months ahead as to what will be happening next.

For that reason there is a renewed emphasis in our discussions with the allies on the important role that western institutions, particularly NATO, can play as a stabilizing force, a force for security in this great period of change.

I can tell you that there is broad agreement within the alliance on the European side and the North American side that a healthy Atlantic alliance remains indispensable and that it should play a critical role in securing the peace and in advancing democracy and the economic reforms that we are looking for in the East. This is the principal political task for NATO in the coming period.

Now, of course it is true that NATO need not be the only channel for consultations of the Atlantic partners on any and all issues. There are many such channels, and Secretary Baker has identified the U.S.-EC relationship as one that we hope to build more strongly and see thrive, and the CSCE that Secretary Dobbins referred to is clearly also another.

But as we with our allies seek to manage East-West relations in a comprehensive and integrated manner, we need to use all of these means which the NATO machinery, of course, uniquely provides to consult and coordinate at a strategic level on how we are going to approach this situation.

As a consequence, our discussions in NATO these days cover a broad range of political and economic issues as well as military ones, and I would just cite as an illustrative case just to give you a

flavor of what we are doing in practical terms what our agendas have included during the course of the last week or so.

We have had extensive exchanges on political developments and economic prospects within the Soviet Union and in the different countries of Eastern Europe. We have had work within NATO on the high level task force to support the arms negotiations for the reduction of conventional forces in Europe. We have had also comparable efforts in a reinforced version of that organization to mesh United States and allied defense planning with that arms control so that when we come out on our side with a certain allocation of equipment and manpower, we will know how to divide that up between the different countries.

We have worked hard this week on elaborating the NATO positions for the Open Skies initiative that the President inaugurated and as to which there is an important conference in Ottawa next week between the ministers of NATO and the ministers of the Warsaw Pact countries.

We have considered Secretary Baker's proposal that there be established a new body in NATO that would be a verification support staff to coordinate and share information in the immense verification task that we will have with the CFE agreement of assuring that these agreements are complied with.

And, finally, we have a detailed discussion of how best to use the CSCE process in support of our longer term goals and reached agreement in the alliance on–the goals that we would have for a summit meeting on the CSCE later this year, although much more remains to be discussed on that subject. That is just in the last 10 days.

You can see how wide ranging our work is. In the future we will seek to broaden even further the scope of our political consultations within NATO.

The December communique recognized the need for all of the members of the alliance to join in devising responses to some new threats that we face in the world such as the question of the proliferation of destabilizing military technologies, on environmental problems, on terrorism, and on dealing with conflicts outside Of the strictly NATO area which have an effect on the security of the members of the alliance.

In his Berlin speech Secretary Baker identified construction of a new security structure for Europe as one of NATO's primary tasks for the future. The foundation of that security for members will continue to be our collective efforts on behalf of the common defense, and I think that NATO's strategy of deterrents for the prevention of war based upon both nuclear and conventional forces remains the best way to prevent war and protect our freedom.

The alliance is committed to ensure the continued viability and credibility of our forces, both convention and nuclear, even at the same as we do try to reduce them, and we anticipate reducing them to the lowest possible levels.

Let me say just a word about the CFE initiative that the President has put forward which was welcomed in Europe this past week after the State of the Union address because this holds the most immediate promise for reductions in conventional forces and

the very dramatic reduction in the size of Soviet conventional forces.

Within NATO there is strong agreement on the vital contribution, I should say, that U.S. military forces in Europe both nuclear and conventional, play and will continue to play, and it is in that framework that the President's initiative on U.S. manpower levels has been made.

There is also agreement that the changes which have taken place in Europe over the last 3 months now make it possible to propose within the CFE talks even lower levels for the United States and Soviet forces than we had previously envisioned, and that is why we have now proposed a limit, an upward limit, on United States and Soviet ground forces and air force manpower of 195,000 on each side in Central Europe and Eastern Europe, which is the area where the forces are most concentrated. This would leave some 225,000 total United States ground and air forces stationed in all of Europe after the CFE reductions are completed.

This new initiative accomplishes several objectives. It gives increased momentum toward an early conclusion of the CFE in 1990, and we are very optimistic about that negotiation and meeting this extremely ambitious timetable for a complex negotiation of this type.

The initiative also sets a minimum level of U.S. forces that are needed in Europe to protect American interests and to sustain the NATO strategy of forward defense and flexible response.

I should say very clearly that this proposal does not legitimize Soviet rights to maintain that number or any number of troops in Eastern Europe. That question is clearly one to be resolved between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe where their troops are currently hosted.

Even if—and we do expect this—Soviet forces in this region are reduced below that 195,000 figure, even to zero, we would envision for the reasons of the stability of the alliance and the coupling of the United States and Europe that U.S. forces would remain at the new level that the President announced.

United States and Soviet forces that are stationed in Europe simply do not have similar purposes nor have Soviet forces been requested to be where they are by legitimate governments as ours have been and, of course, in addition, the Soviet forces, even when they are withdrawn to the Soviet Union, if that is the case, they are withdrawn only a relatively short distance from Europe, not as ours would be across the Atlantic.

The allied response, as I said, to the President's proposal has been extremely positive. The Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred Woerner, noted the initiative as further evidence that NATO maintains the conceptual leadership in these negotiations in Vienna, and I think the proposal takes full account of the developments within the East while maintaining the consistent requirement for NATO's deterrents and the linkage between the United States and our European allies in the interests of security of us both.

The difficulties that we have seen for our security over the years have started typically in Europe. We cannot divorce ourselves in the United States or our security from the security of that continent.

The last 40 years we adapted an approach through the transatlantic connection through NATO of joining with our European allies in a collective security arrangement, but a defensive collective security arrangement. This has worked better for them and better for us.

I do not think that anybody anticipates a situation in Europe where the Soviet Union and all of the other countries there are not so situated that the stability of that continent would not be enhanced by the participation and involvement of the United States there. Certainly our allies feel that very strongly.

It is for that reason that we support the alliance and view it as the instrument for maintaining our security because it addresses the security problems on the continent which have shown their propensity too often to draw us into them when they are not tended to properly.

I appreciate very much, Mr. Chairman, the opportunity to appear before you and to appear with Secretary Dobbins, and I know that both he and I would be glad to take your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Taft follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. TAFT, IV

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to be here to discuss the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Last week, the Secretary of State outlined for you the fundamentals of the administration's foreign policy and today, Acting Assistant Secretary Dobbins discussed our policy in light of recent developments in United States-European relations. For my part, I will seek to give you a firsthand sense of what all this means for our day-to-day work at NATO Headquarters.

Acting Assistant Secretary Dobbins has already cited some of the important documents underlying our work: the Summit Declaration and the Alliance's Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control arising out of last May's meeting of NATO leaders, the Secretary of State's December 12 speech in Berlin on the future of Europe, and the communique that NATO Foreign Ministers agreed upon in Brussels only a few days following. Taken together, they constitute a basic roadmap for the Alliance, indicating where we, together with our allies, are seeking to head over the coming year.

The Alliance's Role Admist Change

As the President noted in his State of the Union address, we stand at "the beginning of a new era in the world's affairs." At NATO, our European and Canadian allies are approaching the challenges of this new era with great excitement and hope and, not surprisingly, a degree of caution as well. They are heartened by new opportunities to overcome the postwar division of Europe—goal that has always been fundamental to the Alliance. But they are also acutely aware of the potential for uncertainty and instability that the current dramatic changes in the East may entail.

For that reason, there is a renewed emphasis in our discussions with the Allies on the important role of Western institutions, and particularly that of NATO, in this period of structural change in postwar Europe.

Today, I can report to you that there is broad agreement among allied governments that a healthy Atlantic Alliance remains indispensable—that it will continue to play a critical role in securing peace and democracy and in ensuring that further change in Europe will be both peaceful and stabilizing. As Secretary Baker noted to you last week: "The ending of the Cold War does not mean an end to the most successful alliance in modern history."

NATO foreign ministers put these ideas in the following way at last December meeting of the North Atlantic Council. On the one hand, they saw no less importance in NATO's long-standing mission of deterring aggression:

"In the midst of change and uncertainty, the Alliance remains a reliable guarantor of peace. It will provide an indispensable foundation of stability, security and cooperation for Europe of the future."

But at the same time, ministers also agreed that NATO must increasingly be called upon to carry out its political function, particularly in support of the development of greater freedom within the East:

"[The Alliance] must take up new challenges. Our task is to use actively and creatively the potential of our Alliance in the pursuit of political change within stability."

The Political Function of NATO

What does this mean in practical terms for NATO? In an important sense, it is a return to the fundamentally political nature of the Atlantic Alliance. It is driven by a recognition, not only that current international developments demand intensified consultations, but that again to quote NATO foreign ministers:

"[The Alliance] constitutes the only forum for permanent discussion between the Atlantic partners based on an integrated approach to political, economic and military elements of security."

NATO need not be the only channel for consultations with our Atlantic partners on any and all issues of the day; there are many that we will want to use. But, as we and our Allies seek to manage East-West relations in a comprehensive and integrated manner, we need to make full use of the means—which the NATO machinery uniquely provides—to consult and coordinate at a strategic level on a wide range of issues.

As a Consequence, our discussions at NATO Headquarters in Brussels these days are not exclusively military in nature; they cover a host of political and economic issues as well. I would cite—as an illustrative but not exhaustive example—our NATO agenda of the last 2 weeks. Among other things, this has included:

—Extensive exchanges on political developments and economic prospects within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;

—Work within NATO's High-Level Task Force (HLTF) in support of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations;

—Comparable efforts in a reinforced version of the HLTF to mesh U.S. and allied defense planning with arms control;

—Elaboration of NATO situations on the President's "Open Skies" initiative for next week's conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact ministers in Ottawa;

—Consideration of Secretary Baker's proposal for a new NATO body charged with arms control verification support, and

—Detailed discussion of how best to use the CSCE process in support of our longer-term policy goals.

Over the Coming year, we will seek to broaden even further the scope of our political consultations at NATO. This past December's communique was a useful step forward in recognizing the need for all members of the Alliance to join in devising common responses to new threats to our societies, including the spread of destabilizing military technologies, environmental problems, terrorism, and regional conflicts.

NATO and Future European Security Structures

In his Berlin speech, Secretary Baker identified construction of a new security structure for Europe as one of NATO's primary tasks for the future. The foundation for the security of the members of the Alliance will continue to be NATO's collective efforts on behalf of the common defense. For the foreseeable future, NATO's strategy of deterrence for the prevention of war, based upon both nuclear and conventional forces, remains the best way to prevent war and protect our freedom. The Alliance is committed to ensure the continued viability and credibility of these forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.

At the same time, NATO is also pursuing as its highest arms control priority an important new element for Europe's future security: the CFE treaty now under negotiation in Vienna. A treat along the lines of the Alliance's proposals would have the effect of significantly enhancing European security and stability. Today, I will not go into all of the details of CFE, but simply report on NATO's consultations on the most important recent development in CFE: the Presidents initiative on new manpower levels for United States and Soviet forces in the Central Zone.

Within NATO, there is strong agreement on the vital contribution that U.S. military forces in Europe, both nuclear and conventional, will continue to make to the common security. There is also agreement that the changes which have taken place in Europe over the last 3 months now make it possible to propose within the CFE talks even lower levels of United States and Soviet conventional forces than previously envisaged. Accordingly, the President has proposed to lower substantially the limits in a CFE Treaty on United States and Soviet ground and air force manpower to 195,000 on each side in Central and Eastern Europe-the area of greatest concen-

tration of forces. This would leave some 225,000 U.S. ground and air force personnel in all of Europe after CFE reductions are completed.

This new initiative accomplishes several objectives. It gives increased momentum toward an early conclusion of CFE in 1990. It sets a minimum level of U.S. forces needed in Europe to protect American interests and to sustain NATO's strategy of forward defense and flexible response. It does not "legitimize" Soviet rights to maintain that number of troops in Eastern Europe; that question is clearly one to be resolved between the Soviet Union and the sovereign nations of Eastern Europe. Even if—as we expect—Soviet forces in this region are reduced even further, we would not envision reducing United States forces in Europe below this new level. United States and Soviet forces are not stationed in Europe for similar purposes nor have Soviet forces been requested by legitimate governments to be in the central zone, as ours have been. In addition, Soviet forces in the U.S.S.R. are much closer to Western Europe than the United States is.

The Allied response to the President's proposal has been extremely positive. As NATO Secretary Gen. Manfred Woerner has noted, this initiative is further evidence that NATO maintains "the conceptual leadership in these negotiations." It takes account of new political developments within the East, while remaining consistent with the needs of NATO's strategy of deterrence.

This new manpower initiative also gives further impetus to the work already underway in the Reinforced HLTF—a new body that NATO has set up in recent months to ensure that CFE reductions among the different members of the Alliance are taken in the manner that best supports our collective security needs. This is an excellent example of NATO as an organization being able to adjust promptly to meet changing circumstances.

NATO and Efforts at European Unity

As Acting Assistant Secretary Dobbins has noted, central to the U.S. commitment to achieve and maintain a Europe whole and free is also our wholehearted support for efforts to build greater European unity and cooperation. The European community's plans for 1992 give an important political dimension, as well as economic, to this move toward integration.

From our exchanges at NATO in recent months, it is clear that, in the midst of current change, a strong Atlantic Alliance and a more unified Europe are proving to be necessary complements of each other's efforts. By creating and sustaining Western unity on the most fundamental questions of collective security and common defense, NATO's success has enabled the European Community to pursue unity where none has existed before, most notably in the economic sphere and now in political matters as well. As Allied Foreign Ministers noted at last December's NAC, the process of European integration is "a natural development that goes hand-in-hand with the continued close partnership between the North American and European members of the Alliance." The cohesion of NATO remains a critical stabilizing factor for Europe's efforts at greater unity.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, my comments today have been necessarily impressionistic; they come after an exceptionally busy first half year as the U.S. Permanent Representative NATO. I have not attempted to cover all of the Alliance's activities nor all of the issues for the coming year. Rather, I have sought to convey some of the reasons why I am bullish about NATO's ability to continue to play a critical role in support of U.S. national interests.

The fundamental importance of NATO's missions—to keep the peace and to provide a framework for political and security cooperation among the North American and European democracies—remains unaltered. In some respects, the importance of having an organization such as NATO to achieve those ends is growing even as we enter a new and more fluid international situation. As major changes Continue in East-West relations, the manner in which NATO as an organization performs its basic tasks will inevitably change as well. As an organization, NATO is already moving to meet these changing circumstances.

The scope of NATO's continued success—in performing its missions and in meeting change positively will be shaped by the role that the U.S. chooses to play within the Alliance. As Secretary Baker indicated to you last week, there will Continue to be no substitute for sustained and effective U.S. leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, and your entire statement will be inserted in the record as if read.

The first question I would have is when we talk about German unification, I am reminded of the phrase of Chancellor Kohl where he referred to the unity of the German people and also Muldrow, that President or Chancellor or whatever it is, the head man in East Germany referred to united Germany as the fatherland for the German people.

Now, when you are talking about German unification, you are talking about the two territories of West and East Germany, not the unity of the German people, all the German people, is that correct?

Mr. DOBBINS. I do not think anybody is talking about German reunification in any terms except the unification of the territory that is now the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

I think that to the extent that ethnic Germans living elsewhere in the Soviet Union, in Europe or, indeed, anywhere else in the world would wish to emigrate to that country they would be welcomed as they have indeed been welcomed and as they have emigrated in large numbers over the last several years.

But nobody and certainly no responsible West German politician has proposed anything except the joining of those two territories.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it should be very clear as a matter of record. I have been here 30 years now, and the years go by pretty quickly. Ten or twenty years from now if there is a call for either what Mr. Muldrow or Mr. Kohl has said, we are saying they do not really mean what they said, the unity of the German people or fatherland to the German people.

And I think the record should show we are very clearly talking about the two territories and that is all.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, would you yield for a question at that point?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, on your time.

Senator SARBANES. If it is the case, as you say. why has Chancellor Kohl in his ten points not included an 11th point recognizing German-Polish border?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think-I do not want to try to speak for the Chancellor, but I think it is basically a tactical matter having to do with securing the acceptance and recognition by the Soviet Union and Poland of German reunification within the territories of the current two Germanys.

The legal position is that the Federal Republic has no common border with Poland and, therefore, has no possible territorial claim or dispute, and Chancellor Kohl cannot speak for a united Germany. He has not been elected by a united Germany. He does not hold that position.

He has repeatedly said that the Federal Republic will have no claims. It is embedded in dozens of treaties.

Personally I think that the border issue, as a component of an ultimate settlement which results in German reunification, will not be a difficult issue because I know of no responsible leader in any country who proposes changing the borders in any respect.

Mr. TAFT. Senator, if I may add, I think Chancellor Kohl did, in fact, add an 11th point so to speak in response to queries in Paris

making it clear that he has no interest in adding old German territory beyond what is in, the GDR. That is not part of his outlook.

The CHAIRMAN. I would add that when I and other Senators were recently with Chancellor Kohl, we pressed him on this question, and the argument he gave us back in reply contained no 11th point. What Kohl said was what Mr. Dobbins just said, that West Germany could not make a statement about borders until they had a peace treaty or were combined with East Germany and then could do it.

I must say I felt at the time that he was reaching for a rather somewhat specious legalistic argument, and at least he left me as one of the Senators who were with him a little concerned.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I think others felt the same way, and it was for that reason that he has been pressed on the point in Europe and has made his position clearer and much more satisfactory, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure all of us will be around 10 or 20 years from now, but let us remember this discussion today. On another matter, I was struck by the action of Belgium of just pulling its forces our of West Germany, period, and do you see signs of this happening with any other of our allies or with the Soviets in East Germany?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think the Belgians have corrected the impression left by an interview given by their defense minister regarding their intentions. What they have done is initiate a contingency study looking at possible different levels of Belgian forces in Germany in different hypothetical situations, but the government as a whole has made clear that this is nothing but a contingency study, that any changes in the Belgian force structure would take place in the context of NATO or East-West arms control and of the general alliance consensus as to what sort of commitment Belgium should maintain.

I think all of the countries, including our own, are obviously looking at the CFE treaty as it is emerging from the negotiation. It will have implications for all of them, and all of them will want to share in the reductions that are inherent in that agreement.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not conceivable thinking also a little bit of the Krautharnrner article we inserted in the record earlier? Is it not conceivable that arms control talks instead of acting as a ceiling for weapons will act as a floor and we will be keeping them up and that the European governments may move more quickly than the negotiators?

I believe it was Clemenceau who once said that war is too important to leave to the generals; and maybe some of these questions of drawdowns are too important to leave to the negotiators, because the governments are moving more quickly and the people more quickly than the negotiators.

What would be your view on that?

Mr. DOBBINS. Well, I think there is an interaction between the two, but I do not think there is an absolutely rigid connection one way or the other. The soviet Union did initiate some unilateral withdrawals of the limited sort before this agreement was concluded, and I think that other countries may well go below the ceilings that are set by the agreement including, perhaps, the Soviet Union.

So, I think that the task of arms control is to ensure that the reductions, once taken, are irreversible in the sense that they cannot be increased and that they are verifiable; that is, that you know they have been taken and you know exactly how they have been taken.

As the political situation allows further reduction, further arms control should, take advantage of that and, again, negotiate agreements that ensure the reductions once taken cannot be reversed and that they can be verified.

The CHAIRMAN. Incidentally, speaking of verifiability, how many of our verifying officials do we have in Europe now following up on the treaty we have ratified?

Mr. DOBBINS. On the INF I cannot give you an exact figure. It runs in the hundreds. Americans stationed in Europe or in the Soviet Union, and then there are others who travel. There is an agency in Washington—it is not an insubstantial force, although it does not compare as a force to the force it replaces.

The CHAIRMAN. And by the same token it would be roughly in the hundreds here in America doing the same thing?

Mr. DOBBINS. There is an agency set up in the United States. I would guess that its total component including people seconded from other agencies to assist would again be in the hundreds.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the intention of the committee to have an educational hearing on this at some point, because I think a whole new structure has come into being, a very important structure with its own rationale, its own esprit de corps, and the American people know only a very little bit about it. I know I know very little about it. That is all from me for the moment. Thank you very much.

Senator Pressler.

Senator PRESSLER. Let me ask, if the Soviet Union were to advocate a zero level, troop level, and pull their troops out in a couple years, would there be any point in the United States keeping troops in Europe?

Mr. TAFT. Let me try that, Senator, because, in fact, we expect the Soviets very well may be asked to leave Eastern Europe, and this is a possibility that one has to envision.

It is important to bear in mind that their troops would not, however, leave the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union is not very far from Europe and, in fact, I think most people would anticipate that even total withdrawal from Eastern Europe would leave the Soviets with an armed forces level in excess of three million, maybe three and a half million men. This is very significant.

The question then is as to how security is maintained in Europe and whether the United States has a role in that.

Our view is that the United States has a great interest in that and that the way to protect this interest and advance this interest is to participate in the alliance for security of our allies there, those who choose to be our allies there.

Senator PRESSLER. Now just a little logic, because I am going to meetings in my State. You say if all the troops go back to the Soviet Union, there are still troops in the Soviet Union but there are many prosperous European countries. How do I tell my con-

stituents that the taxpayers, our taxpayers, have a role in permanently stationing troops in Europe, even if we are at the zero level?

Mr. TAFT. I was going to get to that.

The point is that the situation in Europe is one where you have a very large Soviet military capability. That capability is not simply conventional. It is theater, nuclear and strategic. We have found the best way to meet that for our own purposes is to have a strategic deterrent, for that to be the United States strategic deterrent, that the allies do not have that, and we provide it to them. Also, to have nuclear theater weapons which would counter the Soviet conventional capability there in a critical way and add a crucial deterrent on the ground in the continent.

The conventional troops of the United States provide a linkage, a coupling of our strategic commitment to the alliance. This is the credibility behind the strategic commitment and the overall security of Europe.

Our feeling is that the credibility of the strategic commitment is key to the Soviet Union's being deterred, and we do that by being on the ground in Europe with a small part of our force that could be reduced, but it should be there.

Senator PRESSLER. Not to interrupt you, but regarding the strategic part of it, I can see your logic in terms of some of the missiles and so forth, but I am talking about ground soldiers. Europe does have those and can produce those.

Mr. TAFT. They do, but they do not have American ground soldiers who are an expression of the American commitment to the security and stability and the visible manifestation of that strategic commitment.

Senator PRESSLER. So we need a visible presence, even though we might have mobile troops we could move there very quickly if they were needed—their purpose then is a visible sign of our commitment?

Mr. TAFT. I think that it is the most credible sign that we can muster, and the absence of them, I should say, would be a distinct signal of much less commitment.

Senator PRESSLER. So, I would tell my constituents that we are going to keep troops in Europe for visibility—not for military activities necessarily, but for a visible sign of our commitment?

Mr. TAFT. This is the linkage of the alliance transatlantic which is the key to security in Europe. Europe without the United States is less stable than it is with us.

Senator PRESSLER. I do not want to sound like we are not being friends with our close allies there, but I have a hard time seeing in the long run that we have to prove our commitment to our friends in Europe, we have to have visible soldiers walking around. That seems very strange logic. That is going to be hard for me to sell in South Dakota, at least.

Mr. DOBBINS. Senator, could I add, as I said earlier, under any conceivable scenario, the Soviet Union is going to be the only country in the world that can destroy American society.

Senator PRESSLER. Pardon?

Mr. DOBBINS. The Soviet Union will be the only country in the world, that can destroy our society, and that will be the case under all scenarios that I have seen projected. If a war is going to start, it

will probably start in Europe, and therefore we have a vital interest in preventing that.

Senator PRESSLER. A war with the Soviet Union?

Mr. DOBBINS. A war with the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have a vital interest in maintaining European security.

The American commitment, which is a small proportion of the overall NATO capability but an essential one, is the glue that holds the Western alliance together and provides a cohesive core around which European security can be organized and stability guaranteed, and the kind of historic conflicts which have grown up in Europe for centuries and which have drawn us into two World Wars can be prevented, and if a couple of hundred thousand American troops gives you a guarantee that that will not happen, they are worth every penny.

Senator PRESSLER. If that were true, I would agree with you, but I find it hard to understand, if we have these security agreements and arrangements, why Europe cannot have its own troops there, if they need them.

Mr. TAFT. Europe should have troops there, Senator, and I think it is very important to understand that they do. There are 2.3 million active troops in Europe today, less than 10 percent of them—I am sorry, there are 3 million plus troops in Europe today, and less than 10 percent of them are U.S. troops. Ninety percent of the active troops are provided by Europe. This is exactly the way it should be.

The question is not so much whether we are carrying the burden over there, but do we have a connection with it? Are we involved, and that is what the—8 percent I believe is our current level, and under CFE it will go lower than that. That is what that does.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, the op-ed in the "Post" which the Chairman has referred to, the logic of all this is getting very hard to explain to taxpayers in terms of the long-run cost. I would just remind you there are a lot of people who, in my judgment, believe that German forces, French forces, and those of the other very prosperous countries in that part of the world should carry more of the defense burden.

We can certainly be committed to a country in terms of mutual security without having troops on the ground. Otherwise we would have troops in every country that is friendly to us, if we carried that logic forward, would we not? Certainly, Australia is an ally of ours. We do not need a permanent, visible presence of troops to demonstrate that, if that is the basic reason.

Mr. DOBBINS. Senator, if the West Europeans were a truly united nation, then their ability not just to field troops but to provide leadership and a coherent set of policies could well provide an alternative to the kind of leadership that is provided by the United States, and that may happen some day, but nobody sees it happening soon.

As long as that does not occur, the United States is going to need to provide that core of leadership, and a commitment of troops, as well as a commitment of time and effort on the part of the political leadership, is essential to maintaining that.

Senator PRESSLER. So we must provide the core of leadership and the U.S. troops for very prosperous European countries that really have not requested us to stay there?

Mr. DOBBINS. If they do not request us to stay, we certainly will not stay. They have requested us to stay, and I am confident they will continue to do so.

Mr. TAFT. Let me just elaborate a little bit on the question of these troops, because I take it your feeling is that we have the commitment, and we fulfill that commitment' presumably by having the troops in the United States.

I agree that the bulk of our troops perhaps should be in the United States, but if we are going to be maintaining, to fulfill the commitment, 400,000, 500,000 troops in the United States to fulfill that commitment, I would suggest to you that you will do much better to have a proportion of those troops, not for a significant budget cost difference actually maintaining them in the United States or maintaining them in Europe, that we ought to be put some in Europe.

They deter better. They contribute more to stability by being in Europe than they do by being in the United States a portion of them. That is the argument.

Senator PRESSLER. Well, I am sure the Europeans probably want us to keep on paying the bills and providing the money, but I think there is quite a bit of responsibility on their part, if there is a threat and if they feel that they are threatened by the Soviet Union, for a greater effort on their part.

But I can tell you that this 195,000 level, I do not know where it came from. I do not know why we are not talking about a zero level, as a conservative columnist today, one writer I think is conservative, suggests.

I see my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a very important hearing and I want to commend the Chairman for scheduling it.

Gentlemen, I have an uneasy feeling as I listen to you that we are not thinking anew in view of the changing circumstances. One of my colleagues in the Congress commented yesterday that the President is running around the country right now trying to beat plowshares into swords.

He is on a 1-week trip across the country to one military installation after another, I guess, intended to demonstrate that there is no peace dividend an we have to continue to spend on the military.

Now, accepting all of the arguments about proceeding with prudence, with care, that there is still a threat—not the same threat, I assume both of you would agree—let me ask that question to begin with. Do you perceive the threat which the West, the United States and its allies faces in Europe to be the same today in its magnitude as it was 2 or 3 years ago, or would you perceive that threat as having diminished?

Mr. TAFT. I perceive it as very much diminished, Senator, and this is the consensus within the alliance. In addition, we have, of course, the INF Treaty which is working all the time to reduce the weapons there.

Senator SARBANES. All right. Now, under your analysis, following up what Senator Pressler I thought in a very perceptive way, how many troops would we need in Europe to demonstrate this U.S. commitment? I take it the sort of showing of the flag that would reassure our allies that we identify their security with our security and are prepared to make a commitment.

Mr. TAFT. Well, I think that we ought to have a reasonable proportion of the troops that we have raised for that purpose. I think that in the past that has tended to be toward, say 30 percent of the total of the army.

I think one could reduce that down to 20 percent in a smaller army, which would be much smaller than it has been, but it seems to me that given the basic commitment to Europe that the thing we ought to do is to carry that commitment in the place where it is most effectively carried, and there is no question in my mind but that a U.S. soldier in Germany deters war a lot better than the U.S. soldier in the United States.

Senator SARBANES. I do not want to argue that point. Let me accept that point for the moment, because I am trying to develop a different point. How many such U.S. soldiers are needed to demonstrate this proposition of yours?

Mr. TAFT. We think that the level of 225,000 which has been proposed will do it.

Senator SARBANES. Wait a second, you made the same argument when it was 275,000. The same questions were asked. This is not in the dim past, this is only a matter of months, perhaps only weeks ago.

Before the State of the Union message, let us put it that way, the same questions were asked. We were told 275,000. That encompasses the President's proposal to reduce American forces by 30,000—275,000. That is the number we needed to accomplish this point.

Then the President wants—in effect, a news item. Events are moving very fast, so we get the reduction in forces, sort of all of a sudden, in a sense, an American initiative—unilateral, in a sense although I gather it was consulted with our European allies.

Now we are being told that, this new figure is the absolute figure that we have to have. It is changing very fast. I want to know from you what you think.

I do not want to argue your basic premise at the moment. At the moment. Right now I accept your assertion that we need some presence in Europe to demonstrate this commitment.

The question my colleague was putting, and as he says, it may be difficult to explain to our public, but let us accept that. What is that number?

Mr. TAFT. The difference between——

Senator SARBANES. Do not give me magic, because 3 weeks ago the magic was 275,000. Give me an analysis that tells me what the number is.

I see a former distinguished Secretary of State in the morning paper talking about a new security system for Europe, and talking about dramatically reducing U.S. and other foreign forces on German soil down to one division of U.S. ground forces.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Dobbins would like to say something further, but I would just point out the difference is not 3 weeks, the difference is the difference between last May and this January, and I think everybody knows that there is a great deal of difference on the ground in Europe.

The President's change of his numbers from 275,000 down to 195,000, or 225,000, was responsive to those developments which everyone agrees have changed the situation, Senator. But Mr. Dobbins would like to comment,

Mr. DOBBINS. Just to emphasize that point, in November and December of last year you had democratic revolutions in Bulgaria, Romania and the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, which fundamentally changed the situation in Eastern Europe.

Those occurred in November and December, and in January the President put forward a new proposal after considering it within the administration and consulting with our allies. I think that is remarkably responsive to the changes in the situation.

Now, if you are asking for numbers on a situation that is totally different from the one we can now project with reasonable certainty over the next several years, that is a different question, Senator.

Senator SARBANES. So, it is your position that at least over the next several years 195,000 is the rock bottom number, is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. This looks right to the President's military advisers. It provides for one corps of ground forces, which is a unit that if you go lower than that you do not have a lot of the support that a division needs plus the headquarters people to receive the reinforcements which now have to come from the United States.

That is essentially how it is structured, but it is more of a military determination of the organization of forces to have one corps plus the headquarters people. Then on the air side, it is about 50,000 or 60,000.

Senator SARBANES. Is it your view that the percent of American forces of the Western alliance in Europe should decline from what the percent has been?

Mr. TAFT. Senator, on the number of forces I would say yes, but depending on the situation, perhaps we should—we have a minimum to keep the glue together of the alliance, the reasons was just discussing with Senator Pressler, which might in a small way suggest that we have a floor that we cannot go below. Whereas, the Europeans perhaps can come down on their forces for other reasons, they have other concerns, and all of their forces are there, of course.

Senator SARBANES. So you then envision a situation, I take it from that answer, that this 195,000 is a minimum in which our percentage of the forces of this joint alliance in Europe could, in fact, go up?

Mr. TAFT. I do not anticipate that, but I think at some point you have to not rule it out. I would anticipate that our share is going down.

Senator SARBANES. How can you sit there and tell me we should anticipate that and give me a position that is prepared to countenance the notion that with this changing circumstance we are

going to have a situation in which the American share of the western forces will, in fact, increase?

I want to hear my colleague try to explain that one?

Mr. TAFT. I do not anticipate that, Senator. That is what I said.

Senator SARBANES. But you have left it open as a possibility. You have not even precluded that this morning.

It would seem to me that an operating premise here ought to be that the U.S. percentage of the joint force will, in fact, be reduced. You are not telling me——

Mr. TAFT. That is what I anticipate.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that, but you are leaving open the possibility that it may, in fact, be increased, that the Belgians will take their troops out, the Germans will cut their troops as they have now agreed to do and on and on and on, and that the end result of all of this could be—could be—since you have committed us to an irreducible minimum in terms of numbers-could be a larger U.S. percentage share of the joint force defending Europe.

Now, how in the world can you even leave that option open?

Mr. TAFT. Senator, I would say that our total force should never be a higher percentage than it is now. I would expect the reductions that we take after we get down to a certain minimum in Europe for the linkage and coupling requirements, we would then be taking the reductions in forces in the United States below that minimum. I would expect we would share—and we certainly have shared in recent years and I think in the future we intend to share fully, more than fully in the total reductions in commitment of resources to defense.

Our reductions do not all come in Europe. That is the point.

Senator SARBANES. Ah. Let me put this question to you. You leave open the possibility that the U.S. percent of the western forces in Europe would, in fact, increase; is that correct?

Mr. DOBBINS. Senator Senator——

Senator SARBANES. I am asking the Ambassador. Is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. It is possible at some point that our minimum, Senator, because it is a minimum and it is established for linkage purposes, Senator. And once we get to that minimum, then any reduction in European forces at all would have the effect you suggest. But I think frankly we would like to maintain our minimum, take our reductions elsewhere, not in Europe, but take them so that our minimum force is maintained and mathematically if we have reductions on the allied forces, what you suggest will take place in looking only at forces in Europe, but that is not the U.S. commitment to Europe. The U.S. commitment to Europe is the forces we have in Europe plus the forces we have back here.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Ambassador, let me just say this to you. You can try to explain that, but I do not see how. Suppose the Europeans just eliminated their forces and we kept our minimum and we provided 100 percent of the western alliance, to take the most extreme example, or they cut their forces and our percent of it—what is our percentage now, 30 percent?

Mr. TAFT. Our percentage of the forces in Europe is about 8 percent.

Senator SARBANES. Eight percent? All right. So, they take their forces down, and our percentage goes up to 15 percent, 20 percent,

25 percent because we are keeping this fixed number you have and meanwhile, they are taking their forces down, and it is their territory.

My time is up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the extra time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Simon.

Mr. DOBBINS. Could I just add, Mr. Chairman, one word on this to clarify the point?

The reductions the President is proposing will result in our taking roughly twice the number of reductions of the rest of the Europeans. That is what is being proposed.

The CHAIRMAN. We can come back to this point, but Senator Simon is recognized.

Senator SIMON. OK. It seems to me that we have to be much more responsive to a new situation, and that includes this issue that Senator Pressler and Senator Sarbanes have talked about.

We are spending in the United States roughly 6 percent of our GNP on defense. Our friends in Western Europe are spending about 3.3 percent on an average.

I think clearly we are in a different world today where we do not face the same kind of a threat.

You mentioned, Mr. Ambassador, Jim Baker's statement in Berlin. He called for a new architecture for a new era. I think we need that.

Now, he made three points: One, that NATO establish an arms control verification staff. Your statement says that that is under consideration. What does that mean when it is under consideration? Are we moving ahead? Is it just being talked about?

Mr. TAFT. That means that we have made a specific proposal which I outlined in a meeting last week to the other ambassadors permanent representatives of the alliance, and that is being considered there. And we will work to have it in place when the verification requirement comes.

The other allies have views on it. They will let us know what those are, and we will work to set it up.

Senator SIMON. Does this mean that we are likely to get a decision in 3 months or 3 years or how long?

Mr. TAFT. We are hoping that we will be ready to have this verification support staff in place at the time when the verification of CFE is required, which would be after the treaty is signed, which we hope will be this year.

Senator SIMON. Then the second point he mentioned, NATO should involve itself more in trying to solve regional 4 conflicts. Any movement in that area at all?

Mr. TAFT. This is an area where we have consultations on these matters. It depends on the particular problems involved.

Some years we had some successful cooperation with our allies in the Persian Gulf, original matter discussed in NATO worked out with the Western European Union ultimately. We have had discussions on the Middle East. We will have discussions on the Far East, but that agenda is more driven by the particular events.

Senator SIMON. So, that is kind of an ongoing thing. It really is not anything new?

Mr. TAFT. Well, we are hoping to and intending to increase this discussions and to make them more regular and more rich.

Senator SIMON. That is a rich statement. I will leave it at that and then consider taking on some more political and economic responsibilities.

It does seem to me that there are some more specific things that could be done. For example, NATO taking a whole look at their ability to respond to disaster relief, not necessarily just within the NATO area, but if there is a problem in the Soviet Union, if there is a problem in Ethiopia, wherever it might be, it seems to me that is a kind of thing. Then environmental problems:

Clearly Eastern Europe has some major environmental problems. Poland has the steel plant with just overwhelming pollution—people in Krakow live an average of 4 years less than the people in the rest of Poland.

The industries in Czechoslovakia on the border of Poland are sending some major environmental problems in. I would think NATO working with our Warsaw Pact friends could maybe do some things there.

Why not at this point when we are in a very different kind of a situation, why does not the United States join with Great Britain and France—and I recognize France is not officially a full member of NATO—why do we not join in officially saying we will stop all nuclear warhead testing if you will stop all nuclear warhead testing. Very simple. It is verifiable. We can do it. We can build a better world, you know, almost overnight. Why do we not try some things that really are new and different? I have given you a pretty good menu there.

Mr. TAFT. Well, Senator, I like you menu up until the last part, which really falls more outside of my area of expertise, but in the environment

Senator SIMON. If I recall, you were in the Defense Department for a while, so it is an area where you have some expertise.

Mr. TAFT. But I am aware that we are having negotiations with the Soviet Union on these subjects of testing. What I am not aware of for the last year or so is where they stand in detail. But certainly the environment, disaster relief, the assistance to economies and institution building in these new democracies that are getting underway in the East, these are things that we have in mind for NATO to get more involved with than it has.

And then—that Secretary Baker anticipated. We want to see these things discussed more in NATO because we think they contribute—having a coordinated policy on them will contribute to our security and to the stability of the continent which is what we are in business for.

So, we are basically with you on these new ideas, and we are pursuing them.

Senator SIMON. It just seems to me that we ought to be pursuing those kinds of things a little more vigorously.

Mr. TAFT. One point I should also have made, France is an official member of NATO. They are not in the integrated military structure, but they would be part of a discussion of these things, the environmental things and the economic things and the political things. They are in that part.

Senator SIMON. Obviously even militarily I understand they are cooperating with us, so they are almost a member.

Mr. TAFT. They would be part of this discussion.

Senator SIMON. One other comment in relation to the troops that Senator Sarbanes and Senator Pressler were asking you about. It seems to me we have 1,500 places where we have troops stationed overseas. We are now 20 percent of the worlds economy. When we were 40 percent of the world's economy, we had 1,500 places where we had troops stationed overseas.

Now, we are talking about some cutback. But if you take a look at the cutbacks we are making overseas relative to closing bases here in the United States, it is a very disproportionate cutback here in the United States.

It seems to me that it makes infinitely more sense from a trade deficit point of view and from other points of view to have more significant cutbacks overseas rather than to be closing the bases here in the United States. That is just a general comment.

And one final question. Former Secretary Henry Kissinger has proposed that we shift in a variety of ways, shift what is happening to NATO a little more to our Western European allies including having the NATO commander not be an American. Any comments on that suggestion?

Mr. TAFT. If I could, I would say first with respect to the question essentially of troops overseas that, of course, Secretary Cheney has proposed the closing of a number of foreign bases, and these can be done. There is no reason why foreign bases should be at all exempt as the United States is pulling down its defense budget, and they are not.

I would stress that in pursuing our policies, there are advantages to having troops forward deployed. The troops in Korea deter war better in Korea than if they are in your State of Illinois. Likewise, in Europe they deter war better by being in Europe than by being committed to Europe from the United States.

One can argue about the level, but at some point, if we are going, to have troops and we are asking where do they do the most good, they do more good, in my judgment, in deterring war forward than they do in the United States.

Now, if they are demobilized, that is a different aspect.

Senator SIMON. If I could just interrupt for one brief comment, it depends on what "forward" is. If the great threat is the Soviet Union today, then you are correct. It seems to me it is very clear that is a declining threat, so there is a declining need for that.

It is much more, likely that our troops are going to be deployed for real service in a Panama kind of situation, in a Grenada kind of situation, whatever your views may be on that, and we can train them just as well here as anywhere else.

But I interrupted you.

Mr. TAFT. Our army, I think it is worth remembering, our army is being reduced by some 30,000 to 40,000 people in the course of these 2 years. No European army is experiencing such a reduction—none. They are holding right where they are. Ours is going down 30,000 to 40,000 people between fiscal years 1989 and 1991.

Senator SIMON. Out of 2.1 million.

Mr. TAFT. Well, the army is 750,000 or something. There are, I think 100,000 out of the 2.1 million.

Senator SIMON. My time is up, but I would like your comments on Henry Kissinger's suggestion.

Mr. TAFT. I am sorry, Senator?

Senator SIMON. The NATO commander.

Mr. TAFT. Oh, the European Commander for NATO. I would say that the present system has worked very well, and I have not seen any sentiment in Europe that would suggest that they would prefer to have a European Commander. There is nothing written in stone that it always has to be this way, but it has worked all right. I am not prepared to tell them we are not going to fill the post if they want it.

Senator SIMON. It is kind of a symbol of our taking more than our share of the burden, and I think that is what we are doing, and I think that part of it should cease.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. It seems to me that what we have here is sort of a trigger effect. The reason for our troops in Berlin is not that they could stop an invasion of Berlin, but they would be a trigger which would involve the United States if such an effort was made, and what you are suggesting here is, by the same token our troops in Europe would act as a trigger, and in fact demonstrate to the other allies that we would resist by force. Would that be a correct statement?

Mr. TAFT. Berlin—that is a very special case, but in the forward area in Germany, certainly, our troops are there not only for the military capability that they contribute directly, which in theory could be contributed by the Europeans with more people, if they had them, but in addition for the linkage, the coupling that they give the transatlantic connection and the credibility that they give to our strategic commitment.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Soviets in your view likely to acquiesce in the unilateral demands for their departure? What would be their reaction when Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary ask them to withdraw their troops?

Mr. TAFT. I would hope that they would withdraw, and there are indications that they are speaking with the Hungarians and the Czechoslovakians to reach a conclusion about that, but Jim, do you have any more information on that?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think they will make an effort to slow the process down somewhat, but assuming there is no real reversal in current policies in the Soviet Union, I think we would anticipate that they would withdraw from the countries that have requested it so far, which is Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Others will press demands which may not involve total withdrawal. One just does not know, and I think the Soviets will try to accommodate those, but probably not with great alacrity.

Mr. TAFT. There were periods since the war, until 1968 in Czechoslovakia and until 1956 in Hungary, when the Soviets did not have troops there anyway, so there have been times when they have not had troops there. Germany may be a different case for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You are right, they did not have them in Czechoslovakia before 1968, but from your knowledge of the area, which countries in Eastern Europe might not be pressing for Soviet withdrawals.

Mr. DOBBINS. I think at the moment, if I remember correctly, neither the East German nor the Polish Government have made such demands, which are the other two countries in which they have troops.

The CHAIRMAN. But if we proceed without doing it according to treaty, but on an ad hoc basis where country X pulls out its, country Y pulls out its, et cetera, will it not create an unstable situation? Is it not important that the treaty arrangements rush to catch up?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think it is important that the treaty arrangements put in place as quickly as possible, and that they be renegotiated, supplemented and modernized as the situation changes, so I think our thrust is to try to get the treaty that is under negotiation wrapped up. We have proposed an important amendment to it, and we believe the quicker this treaty can be concluded, ratified and put into effect, the quicker we can lock in the changes that are already underway and then begin discussing further ones.

The CHAIRMAN. Going for a moment to Vienna and the CFE, what is the reason for the slowness with which those negotiations are going? It seems to me, what is needed is what Gorbachev said. The political leaders have to pound the table a little bit.

You have, I think, in these negotiations, having followed them since 1970 or 1972—it becomes a way of life for the negotiators. Six weeks there and six weeks back here, you get used to it. It is not a particularly agreeable life, but it is an interesting one. Would you concur in my thought that things could be going faster if the political leadership so insisted on both sides?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think the political leaders do need to drive the process or it will drift. There is no doubt about that. On the other hand, these are new negotiations, and if you compare them with any historical negotiation, they have moved with breathtaking speed. They only began last year.

You have got 23 nations involved, and you have achieved agreement in principle on a broad range of issues. There are still some to be worked out, and there is treaty language to be negotiated, but I think there is general agreement that it can be done this year, and there is general agreement it probably will be done this year, and that is remarkable, given the complexity and the breadth of this agreement.

The Secretary proposed in December that this upcoming meeting next week in Ottawa, where 23 foreign ministers will meet to launch an open skies negotiation, should also do what you have suggested, senator, which is, give a political impulse to the negotiation. They will devote time to CFE, and we would hope they can move some issues forward, maybe even agree on a few.

The CHAIRMAN. Turning for the moment to START, which is a bilateral agreement, not with 23 other nations, really we were able to put the pieces together prior to this administration coming into power. How do you account for the delay there?

Mr. DOBBINS. I think the hope is that we can have all of the major issues in START agreed by this summer, by June, in fact, and ideally even have a treaty ready. Secretary Baker is going to be giving a press conference in a few minutes, so I will not try to preempt that, but there was a hope that three of the remaining issues could be settled during this ministerial in Moscow.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I think I can say in fairness, as a member of the previous administration, we really did leave some very hard issues. There were a lot that were solved, but some very tough ones remained.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope they will be resolved today. We will find out later on.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Gentlemen, I am becoming increasingly concerned about this problem, that the CFE arrangements may legitimate Soviet presence in Eastern Europe.

Ambassador Taft, you made a statement that said well, it would not do that, but it essentially was simply an assertion that it would not do it. I mean, I did not find the underlying substance to it.

The Chairman referred earlier to this article by Krauthammer in this morning's paper. I quote it: "The CFE process is simply prolonging the Soviet stay in Eastern Europe at a time when every other force, natural and political, is demanding their departure."

Now, why is that not a real concern? I mean, you are going to have an agreement, on which the Eastern European nations will also sign, is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. They are going to sign an agreement which in effect will encompass within it the continued presence, even if we go to these lower figures, of 195,000 Soviet troops in a zone which encompasses the Eastern European countries, is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. What the treaty would say, and I must say I share very much the concern you have, that these troops presence not be legitimized by this agreement. We absolutely agree with you on that. At the same time, the agreement is going to get rid of a very large number of Soviet troops for sure, and we should not lose sight of that advantage.

But the treaty would provide not that the Soviet Union would have a right to have its troops in Eastern Europe, but that the countries of Eastern Europe, should they choose, would have a right to host Soviet troops. But if they do not choose, it is the right of those countries that is involved, not the right of the Soviet Union to be there without an invitation.

Mr. DOBBINS. Could I just add one point to that, and that is the dynamic between the negotiation politics in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's withdrawal, and I think most observers would agree that this negotiation is an important part of that dynamic; that the impulse given to it by the President's proposals last year, the fact that the negotiation became a reality, that it was not just another negotiation but it really was going to achieve something, gave the Eastern Europeans hope of change which has contributed to the dramatic revolution of the last year.

At the same time, it gave the Soviet Union a conceptual basis, a conceptual alternative for their security, an alternative which would result in significantly lower western levels, as well as lower eastern levels, and gave Gorbachev a basis to argue in his own society that he was moving toward a safer and more secure Europe for the Soviet Union as well.

Senator SARBANES. Would you agree that if the Eastern European countries could get the Soviet troops off their territory, that the reimposition of authoritarian control in those countries, if there were a change in regime in the Soviet Union and comparable forces at work in the Eastern European countries, would be more difficult?

Mr. DOBBINS. Well, the two countries which experienced this most heavily were Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia had no Soviet troops. Hungary had few, if any, and the Soviet Union had no difficulty introducing a sufficient number of troops to reimpose their authority.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think we are still living in that world?

Mr. DOBBINS. No, I do not, but I am simply noting from history, the presence of Soviet troops in the country was not a necessary prerequisite to the Soviets imposing them. Senator SARBANES. I understand. I am trying to find out whether we are learning any lessons from history. Would you say that the presence of Soviet forces in a country give them a greater degree of control and an ability to intervene than if the Soviet troops are not in the country?

Mr. DOBBINS. In principal, certainly.

Senator SARBANES. Well, why did they keep them in those countries once they went in there in order to put down those zones? Was it not exactly for that reason?

Mr. DOBBINS. Oh, most certainly.

Senator SARBANES. What about a situation in which the Soviets took their troops out of Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union, and then you could even discuss where they put them in the Soviet Union, and the United States, while it kept troops in Europe, might move its troops westward—still had them in Europe, so we are still addressing your point.

We may argue about the number necessary, but nevertheless—that might improve the chances of including a united Germany in NATO, if that is what we are seeking to accomplish. That is now the position, I gather. Genscher's view is, at least there would be no forces in East Germany and there is some thinking about diminishing them in West Germany, or taking them westward.

What is wrong with that arrangement? It seems to me it is a very important objective to get the Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe, because in my view it significantly increases the chances that the Eastern European countries will be able to follow an independent course, even if there should be a reversal of developments in the Soviet Union. What is wrong with that approach?

Mr. TAFT. I think the precise deployments of our troops in Europe depends more on the arrangements we make within the alliance. I think that, whether we are more in Germany or France is more in Germany—we are not, of course, the only stationed troops

in Germany at the moment. The French, the Belgians and the British have significant presence, as well as the Canadians.

But making adjustments as to who is forward, and with respect to the GDR I think the proposal that has been made is a very good one. I do not know myself that this would contribute significantly to the Soviet willingness to withdraw from Eastern Europe, which I see as being governed by other considerations.

There is some, in fact, indication that the Soviets feel more comfortable with United States troops in Germany than other types of troops, and would prefer to see United States troops there than, let us say, a larger Bundeswehr.

Senator SARBANES. There is some danger that an equivalency is being assured between the presence of United States troops and the presence of Soviet troops. So the Soviets are going to assert, well, if they take their troops down, we are going to have to take our troops down, the ultimate result of which is if they have zero troops, we have zero troops, which, of course, you would be very concerned about from your exposition this morning; is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. That is correct, sir.

Senator SARBANES. Let me ask a question on the nuclear theater weapons, to which you made reference. The Lance modernization, the follow-on Lance, what would the range of that weapon be?

Mr. TAFT. This would be, I think, in the 300 to 500 kilometer range. That is, I believe, what they are looking at. It has got to be less than 500 kilometers, but I do not believe that they are looking at it as being right up to that mark.

Senator SARBANES. OK. Now I do not know my geography well enough, but I assume you do, Mr. Ambassador. If we put that missile on the most eastern deployable positions of the current NATO alliance, how far would it go into eastern Europe?

Mr. TAFT. It would go 300 to 40 kilometers.

Senator SARBANES. What countries would that hit? Where would it reach to? It would not reach the Soviet Union, obviously.

Mr. TAFT. It would not reach the Soviet Union.

Senator SARBANES. Who would it reach—primarily East Germany?

Mr. TAFT. It would reach East Germany, certainly, and the other countries—Czechoslovakia, I think probably Poland, too, for that matter. This is just a question of drawing the arc on the map.

Senator SARBANES. It would reach Czechoslovakia and Poland to some extent, and East Germany?

Mr. TAFT. I should emphasize it would reach Soviet troops that were marching through those countries toward the West. It would not be intended for any other purpose.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now do you think the Germans are going to accept having these weapons positioned that way if Germany is unified?

Mr. TAFT. Well, you can get different answers to that from different Germans. There is some sentiment in Germany that says that these weapons should be brought in, and I would say probably more at the moment that they should not. What the Alliance has done is to defer a decision on this question until after the CFE negotiation is completed to wrap it up as part of a discussion about these weapons, which the Soviet Union has many of in its arsenal,

an arms control negotiation for a partial reduction of these weapons, and to make a deployment decision on this question in 1992.

Senator SARBANES. Well, now we are being asked to appropriate money for this weapon in this budget; is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. Yes; sir. There are some requests in for the air-to-surface missile and also for the surface-to-surface Lance.

Senator SARBANES. What is the rationale for this weapon, given the changing circumstances that are taking place in Eastern Europe? We are going to have a weapon that is going to reach Havel's Czechoslovakia and Walesa's Poland. And for the moment I am assuming German unification. Do you assume German unification?

Mr. TAFT. I believe there will be a unified Germany, yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. What is the rationale, then, for this weapon?

Mr. TAFT. The rationale is the same as it has always been—that there is the capability of the Soviet Union to mass forces of a conventional sort that will be made much more difficult for them and deterred by the presence of this military capability.

It is not to be used against the civilian populations of these countries at all. It is a military weapon to be used in war and thus to deter that war, to prevent it from happening. That is why we have it today.

Senator SARBANES. I take it that analysis assumes the continued presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe against whom these missiles would be focused; is that correct?

Mr. TAFT. They would be deterring the Soviet Union from introducing its forces in a wartime situation or counting on the capability of doing this, to bring them forward. That is what they are for today.

Senator SARBANES. You are not assuming their need because of the existence of Soviet forces in these territories, because you made reference to that earlier.

Mr. TAFT. No.

Senator SARBANES. When I asked the question, you pointed out with respect to the range of these missiles, as I recall, that there are Soviet forces right there in these countries.

Mr. TAFT. I am saying they would be coming from the Soviet Union to get within range of these weapons. They would have to go through the range of these weapons to get to the countries of the Alliance. And these would be deterring them from doing that. That is the purpose of them.

Senator SARBANES. I see. Well, that is a changed purpose from what the previous analysis had; is that right?

Mr. TAFT. The only changes in the——

Senator SARBANES. I thought the previous analysis was that there were Soviet forces present in these countries, and those forces may move westward and we need these nuclear theater weapons either to deter that or to come into action when that happens; is that correct? Was that the previous analysis?

Mr. TAFT. The change is in the assumption about the location of Soviet forces at the start of the war. The assumption about where they would have to be at some point during the war is the same.

Senator SARBANES. What was the previous rationale for this weapon? It was the presence of Soviet forces in eastern Europe, was it not?

Mr. TAFT. It was and remains that the Soviet Union would have troops, that they, in order to push their conventional attack, they would have to mass these troops in significant numbers for breakthrough, and that these types of weapons deter that type of massing, make it so the planner will not be able to plan on that and will thus not start the war. That is the rationale.

Today the Soviet troops, or your scenario has the Soviet troops starting further back, but eventually, before they get to us, they have to go through the range of these weapons. It is only a question of whether they get there by being there to begin with or by coming through.

Senator SARBANES. What happens when they try to come through? Anything?

Mr. TAFT. When they try to come through, they meet opposition, one hopes.

Senator SARBANES. From the Eastern European countries?

Mr. TAFT. One certainly hopes so, but that would remain to be seen. But these are all very hypothetical scenarios. But this is the purpose of the weapon, is to prevent that massing.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But these weapons are wonderful. They just always seem to develop a new rationale. The circumstances change in rather significant ways, and then all of a sudden we get a new rationale for the weapon system.

Mr. TAFT. One can argue the merits of the Lance follow-on and the difficulty of deploying it, but I honestly think, Senator, that the rationale has always been to counter this massing of Soviet troops.

Senator SARBANES. What do the democratic forces in Eastern Europe think about this weapon system? Do we have any idea?

Mr. TAFT. I do not, Senator. The Soviets have many of them.

Senator SARBANES. Is that important to us?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, it is an important part of the negotiation on SNF.

Senator SARBANES. Would it matter to us what the evolving democratic forces in the eastern European countries, who would be the target area for this missile, think about it? Before we were talking about communist governments aligned with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the scenario was that they would join together in launching this offensive. That is what we were concerned about—a joint offensive of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries.

In effect they were all encompassed as the enemy in this scenario that we had. Now we have a different situation, in which these countries are seeking their independence from Soviet control, from behind the Iron Curtain, and are trying to become democratic nations. Now would it matter to us on this issue what they thought about it?

Suppose they said, we think this is a terrible idea. Would that matter to us?

Mr. TAFT. I think they would participate in these negotiations, Senator, on SNF, and what their view was would matter to us. But I guess it matters less than our concern about deterring the formations of Soviet troops massing in their countries, and I think they

would share that concern too. And this weapon would contribute to deterring that. I think they would be pleased not to have that massing of Soviet troops in their territory, just as we would.

Bear in mind, Senator, also the Soviets have many, many more of these troops than we do—I mean, of these nuclear weapons than we do, which have equally short range and which they use and their allies are fully aware of that.

Senator SARBANES. Of course if the Soviets took their troops out of Eastern Europe, is it not reasonable to assume that the weapons would go with them?

Mr. TAFT. Yes, sir.

Senator SARBANES. In fact, they have been pretty careful about providing nuclear weaponry to other countries. Do they not pretty well keep it under their own control?

Mr. TAFT. They do have very good security in that sense.

Senator SARBANES. In some respects, they have even been more careful about that than we have, have they not, in terms of very tightly controlling nuclear weaponry?

Mr. TAFT. They are very careful about it; we are very careful about it, too.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. The record will stay open for 3 or 4 days for any further questions members may have.

We thank Mr. Taft and Mr. Dobbins very much for being with us. It has been a very educational hearing. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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